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COUNTY DEBT DIFFICULTIES IN KENTUCKY
GLENN D. MoRRow*

Prior to 1890 there existed no constitutional restraints on
county indebtedness. The Third Constitution contained a prohibition respecting state indebtedness1 which was earned over
as section 49 of the present Constitution, but there was nothing
to prevent local subdivisions from plunging indiscrnminately
into debt. "That they had done so and that the situation had
become a grave one is apparent from even a casual reading of
the Constitutional Debates of 1890.
"2 The convention
gave early consideration to the local debt situation, and, except
as amended by section 157a m 1909, present constitutional debt
limitations are a result of its deliberations.3
*Research Assistant, Bureau of Business Research, Umversity of
Kentucky (1941) and Field Representative, Local Finance Unit,
Kentucky Department of Revenue (1942), A. B., 1933, Murray State
Teachers College; M. A., 1940, George Peabody College for Teachers;
public school teacher, 1933-1941, author with Professor James W
Martin of Organization for Kentucky Local Tax Assessments, Urnversity of Kentucky, 1941, and with Orba F Traylor of State Liquor
Monopoly or Private Licensing, Kentucky Legislative Council, 1942.
The writer is particularly indebted to Professor James W Martin, Director of the Bureau of Business Research, Unversity of Kentucky, for is guidance in the preparation of the article, for numerous
suggestions relative to its content, and for editorial assistance.
Acknowledgment is also due Dr. Harry Lynn, State Local Finance
Officer, Kentucky Department of Revenue, Frankfort, KentuckyMr. Amos H. Eblen, Law Offices of Smith and Leary, Frankfort,
Kentucky; Messrs. Ernest Woodward and Franklin P Hays, Law
Offices of Woodward, Dawson and Hobson, Louisville, Kentucky; and
Judge Richard Priest Dietzman, Louisville, Kentucky, who kindly
reviewed and criticized the unfimshed manuscript. The writer also
wishes to explain that nothing in the article reflects any views of the
Department of Revenue; it was written while he was not associated
with the Department.
'Art. II, sec. 35.
'Judge R. P Dietzman, Constitutional Limitations on Public
Indebtedness (1931), 20 Ky L. J. 75, 77. See also Beard v. Hopkinsville, 95 Ky. 239, 247, 24 S. W 872, 874 (1894), Belknap v. City of
Louisville, 99 Ky. 474, 480, 36 S. W 1118, 1119 (1896).
'Constitutional Debates of 1890, vol. I, pp. 70, 85, 130, 135, 162,
164, 165, 167, 168, 172, 174, 178, 189, 190, 195, 211, 229, 254, 262, 266,
vol. II, pp. 2769-2786, 2884-2904, 2958-2980, vol. III, p. 4315, vol. IV,
pp. 5224-5230, 5593-5595, 6039-6040, 6042-6043; Judge Dietzman, ConstitutionalLimitations on Public Indebtedness (1931), 20 Ky. L. J. 75,
77; McDonald v. City of Lexington, 253 Ky. 585, 588, 69 S. W (2d)
1065, 1066 (1934)
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I. COUNTY DEBT LIMrATIONS
After setting out a 50-cent maximum tax levy for other
than school purposes, section 157 of the present Constitution
provides the following limitations
No county
shall be authorized or permitted to
become indebted, in any manner or for any purpose, in an amount
exceeding in any year, the income and revenue provided for such
year, without the assent of two-thirds of the voters thereof, voting
at an election to be held for the purpose; and any indebtedness contractedin violation of this section shall be void. Nor shall such contract be enforceable by the person with whom made; nor shall such
municipality ever be authorized to assume the same." (Emphasis the
writer's.)
Section 158 provides
"
Counties
shall not be authorized or permitted to
incur indebtedness to an amount, including existing indebtedness, in
the aggregate exceeding (2 per cent)
on the value of the taxable property therein, to be estimated by the assessment next before
the last assessment previous to the incurring of the indebtedness
unless in case of emergency, the public health or safety should
so require." (Emphasis the writer's.)
The following sentence was added to safeguard debts existing at the time the Constitution was adopted.
"Nothing herein shall prevent the issue of renewal bonds, or bonds to
fund the floating indebtedness of any
county"
Section 159 provides
"Whenever any
county
is authorized to contract
an indebtedness, it shall be required, at the same time, to provide for the collection of an annual tax sufficient to pay the interest
on said indebtedness, and to create a sinking fund for the principal
thereof, within not more than forty years from the time of contracting the same." (Emphasis the writer's.)
The prohibitions contained in these constitutional mandates
are clear and definite. With all deference due the courts, if
these provisions had been interpreted as they were intended,
counties would be forced to live within their incomes and to
issue bonds only to meet emergencies and to provide for extraordinary capital outlays. "But the provisions were unfortunately
construed in other fashion and that construction has
so entered into the warp and woof of the fabric of our Constitution that we cannot get back to an effectual restraint without a
revision of these provisions.
2Y4
It is for this reason that
Judge Dietzman, ConstitutionalLimitations on Public Indebtedness (1931), 20 Ky. L. J. 78. Also see dissenting opinion of Judge Rees
in City of Frankfort v Fuss, 235 Ky 143, 158, 29 S. W (2d) 603,
610 (1930).
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most administrative difficulties have arisen. Fiscal abuses are
an accomplished fact, it remains for the debt administrator
to cut the "Gordian knot."
No doubt the Court in interpreting these provisions was
influenced by judicial precedents relative to constructions placed
on constitutional limitations respecting state indebtedness. Recently, however, the state debt has been reduced below the
$500,000 constitutional maximum, and legislation has been enacted to moderate the influence of the term "indebtedness" as
embodied in section 47 of the Constitution.5 But the situation
as relates to county indebtedness is otherwise. Here, it is
almost imperative for the courts to abide by precedents, even
though these rarely are consistent and certainly are antithetical
to debt limitation motives as originally intended. Until existing county debts have been refinanced, amortized, compromised,
repudiated, or retired, the courts probably will continue to experience difficulty in following established interpretations and,
at the same time, in employing a logical sequence of reasoning.
The status of a debt incurred in accordance with prior holdings
of the Court cannot justly be abrogated by subsequent decisions. The sheer force of circumstances impels the Court to
perpetuate its own inconsistencies.
NON-VOTED GENERAL FUND DEBT LimiTATIoNs

Judicial construction of constitutional provisions concerning
county general fund indebtedness has generally been characterized by a divided court. Reversed decisions, vigorous dissents,
and irreconcilable opinions have been the rule rather than the
exception. Actions of county officials have not always been
regular; and county records, in many instances, are non-existent,
poorly kept, or designed to be misleading. As a consequence it
is impossible to ascertain with absolute certainty the validity
of non-voted general fund debts, both floating and funded, of
many counties. Many perplexing administrative difficulties will
inevitably accompany any attempt to refinance these debts. Certain of the more apparent difficulties which are already evident
may now be observed.
Nature of the sndebtedness.-Section 157 of the Constitution under winch large amounts of general fund debts have been
'Acts 1942, chap. 39, sec. la, p. 282.
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incurred without a vote of the people, was construed in O'Bryan
v City of Owensboro6 in the same manner as prior prohibitions
on state indebtedness had been construed. Consequently, general fund indebtedness in the meaning of this section is of a
voluntary contractual nature and does not include necessary
governmental expenditures, which are compulsory obligations
cast on the county by lawJ This meaning, however, is restricted
somewhat in that total obligations must not exceed the income
and revenues provided for the year 8 and debts may not now be
contracted to be paid in subsequent years. 9
The object of the limitation is to "protect the people from
their own improvidence and that of their officials, "1 but the
accomplishment of this objective was practically nullified when
necessary governmental expenditures were excluded. Experience has shown that the exclusion of so-called necessary expenditures has merely served to weaken debt limitations and to invite
administrative difficulties and ineffectual budgetary control.
Many counties have consistently made a practice of spending
early in the fiscal year available funds for any and all purposes.
Then, for the remainder of the year the expense of conducting
the necessary functions of government has been met by warrant
issues or unpaid claims. Such a practice circumvents all budget
requirements and debt limitations, and its continued exercise
throughout a series of years has inevitably resulted in the accumulation of large floating debts and financial embarrassment.
*Where this is the case, counties have experienced, and many are
continuing to experience, considerable difficulty in administering their financial affairs.
The court has never defined precisely what is meant by
"necessary governmental expenditures." A few examples, however, may serve to illustrate the delineation which has been
made between those expenses which are necessary and those
which are unnecessary Debts which have been held not prohibited by section 157 include those for- protection of life and prop113 Ky. 680, 691, 68 S. W 858, 862 (1902).
Hopkms County v St. Bernard Coal Company, 114 Ky. 153,
158, 870 S. W 289, 290 (1902).
City of Covington v. McKenna, 99 Ky. 508, 514, 36 S. W 518,
520 (1896).

'Southern Bitulithic Company v. DeTreville, 156 Ky 513, 522,
161 S. W 560, 564 (1913).
" Hopkins County v. St. Bernard Coal Company, 114 Ky. 153,
158, 70 S.W 289, 290 (1902).
L. J.-3
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erty from mob violence," fixed liabilities as officials' salaries, 12
judgments on verdicts for damages by reason of the unsafe
condition of city streets, i s election expenses and expenses of
maintaining county hospitals,14 and expenses incident to protection of public health and abatement of nuisances. 15 But outlays for employment of farm agents,' 6 construction and maintenance of roads and bridges, 17 and erection of courthouses'
have been deemed unnecessary' governmental expenditures.
Obviously the local finance officer, in attempting to ascertain
the validity of debts before giving his official approval, will
have to search these opinions with extreme diligence to find any
principle on which to rely in determining the necessity for any
expenditure not included in either of the particular categories
outlined above. Furthermore, such distinctions have no common sense basis and bear little, if any, relation to sensible fiscal
management.
L'mitatwn measured by "the income and revenues provided
for the year ""-The decisions of the Court respecting income
and revenue estimates are even more unfounded and prejudicial
to practicable financial administration and debt control than the
obviously arbitrary and categorical classification of the objects
for which debts may be legitimately incurred. With the exception
of ad valorem taxes, general fund cash balances, and possibly
Ibid.
Overall v Madisonville, 125 Ky. 684, 696, 102 S. W 278, 282
(19,07), Randolph v Shelby County, 257 Ky 297, 302, 77 S. W (2d)
961, 963 (1934).
Menar v Sanders, 169 Ky 285, 183 S. W 949 (1916).
"Randolph v. Shelby County, 257 Ky 297, 302, 77 S. W (2d)
961, 963 (1934).
'Francis v City of Bowling Green, 259 Ky 525, 530, 82 S. W
(2d) 804, 806 (1935).
"Carman and University, of Ky. v. Hickman County, 185 Ky.
630, 646, 215 S. W 408, 415 (1919), County Fiscal Court v. Russell
County, 246 Ky. 529, 55 S. W (2d) 337 (1932) Adair County Farm
Bureau v Fiscal Court of Adair County, 263 Ky. 23, 91 S. W (2d)
537 (1936). In Carman and University of Ky. v. Hickman County,
county officers were defined as being those officers who are necessary to carry on the business of the county such as judges, jailers,
and the like. A person employed to perform some other service not
necessary to the conduct of the affairs of the county and whom the
fiscal court may or may not employ in its discretion is not a county
officer in the sense that jailers and judges are.
' Nelson County Fiscal Court v. McCrocklin, 175 Ky 199, 209,
194 S. W 323, 327 (1917).
"Carter v. Kruger and Son, 175 Ky. 399, 408, 194 S. W 553,
557 (1917).
U

"
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poll taxes, there is uncertainty as to what receipts may be included in income and revenue estimates. The initial interpretation of the Court in 1907 in Overall v City of Madisonvile19
permitted the inclusion of collectible delinquent taxes of previous
years and funds in the city treasury accumulated from license
taxes, fines, etc., but monies to be derived by a city during an
ensuing year from fines and license fees could not be included
in revenue estimates in determining the amount of debt that
could be incurred, as these are too uncertain and indefinite.
Fortunately, subsequent decisions have not in all particulars
adhered closely to the reasoning employed in the Madisonville
case. 2o
2
In 1908, in Lawrence County v. Lawrence Fiscal Court l
the Court defined income and revenue for the year as including "resources of the municipality which are reasonably solvent,
and wlnch in ordinary events may be fairly relied on as
equivalent to cash." Another definition was given in 1917 when
the income and revenue for the year was held to include "something beyond, or in addition to, the taxes collected for such
year; but, if so, it must consist of sources owned by the county
and in the hands of the county treasurer or fiscal court, which
are not only reasonably solvent, but which, in ordinary events,
may be fairly relied on as equivalent to cash.''22
In 1923 it was held permissible to include poll taxes in
revenue estimates ;23 and, since Billeter and Wi7ey v. State Highway Connisszon24 in 1924, which upheld the State Highway
Commission in including anticipated revenues from motor vehicle registration fees, the Court has become increasingly lenient
n .permitting the inclusion of nnscellaneous revenue receipts an
125 Ky. 684, 695, 102 S. W 278, 281 (1907).
Lawrence County v. Lawrence Fiscal Court, 130 Ky 587, 113
S. W 824 (1908) McCrocklin v Nelson County Fiscal Court, 174
Ky. 308, 192 S. W 494 (1917), Wesley v. Tarter, County Judge, 197
Ky. 493, 247 S. W 353 (1923), and especially Billeter and Wiley v.
State Highway Comission, 203 Ky. 15, 261 S. W 855 (1924), Premer Construction Company v. Kimmell, 230 Ky. 439, 20 S. W (2d)
77 (1929), Nourse v. City of Russellville, 265 Ky 96, 95 S. W (2d)
1096 (1936), and Coffman v. Central City, 267 Ky. 26, 101 S. W (2d)

204 (1937).
130 Ky. 587, 591, 113 S. W 824, 825.
"McCrocklin v. Nelson County Fiscal Court, 174 Ky. 308, 313,

192 S. W 494, 497.
Wesley v. Tarter, County Judge, 197 Ky. 493, 495, 247
203 Ky. 15, 29, 261 S.W 855, 861.

S.W 353.
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income and revenue estimates. The inclusion of motor vehicle
registrations was upheld on the ground that they had become a
fairly stable source of revenue. It was possibly with this decision
25
wrote the
in mind that Judge Dietzman in 1929 reluctantly
decision of the Court which followed earlier decisions and denied
to Henderson County the privilege of including anticipated
26
receipts from occupational licenses in its revenue estimates.
More recent decisions continue to indicate the Court no
longer intends to abide strictly by precedent. It should be
observed, however, that these later decisions also involve the
validity of debts to be funded, and that the Court has been more
lenient in upholding the validity of debts than in authorizing
their incurment. Relative to the right of municipalities to issue
funding bonds to pay outstanding floating indebtedness, Nourse
v City of Russetlville2 7 held that the inclusion of license fees,
fines, receipts from sale of cemetery lots, and miscellaneous receipts did not render the indebtedness invalid. The following
year, 1937, when both the right to fund existing indebtedness
and the authority to incur additional debt were involved, the
inclusion of city licenses and occupational taxes was authorized
where adequate experience had demonstrated that the return
from such sources had become stabilized and dependable, and,
where anticipated revenues from ad valorem, poll and license
taxes, and actual receipts from fines and miscellaneous items in
the aggregate exceed expenditures and obligations assumed each
year, these could also be included, notwithstanding the fact that
25
delinquent taxes could not be included.
Perhaps the complete failure of the Court to harmonize its
decisions with sound principles of fiscal administration can be
made more apparent by singling out for more exhaustive study
the treatment accorded a single item of income, delinquent
taxes. Sound administration requires deduction of anticipated
current year delinquent taxes and the inclusion of expected collections from prior delinquents in making revenue estinates.
2

His reluctance is evidenced by ins personal dissent voiced in

the opinion.
Premier Construction Company v Kimmell, 230 Ky 439, 442,
20 S. W (2d) 77, 79.
7 265 Ky. 96, 99, 95 S. W
(2d) 1096, 1098 (1936).
Coffnan v. Central City, 267 Ky. 26, 101 S. W (2d) 204. The

Court pointed out, however, that fines and miscellaneous receipts
could be considered retroactively, but not prospectively.
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The reluctance of the Court to permit the inclusion of expected
collections from delinquent taxes in county revenue estimates
has been noted. But in respect to revenue estimates for school
purposes an entirely different construction has prevailed. School
superintendents have not been permitted to make any allowance for expected current year delinquent taxes, and local levying bodies have been upheld in refusing to make the required
levies so long as such deductions were included in budget estimates. Tins construction has been based on the theory that to
allow for expected delinquencies would unjustifiably saddle taxpayers who are not delinquent with increased tax levies. In
harmony with this interpretation boards of education have been
authorized to issue tax anticipation notes to cover revenue deficiencies resulting from uncollected taxes.2 9 Seemingly, the
treatment accorded the inclusion of delinquent taxes in revenue
estimates has been based in the case of counties on maintaining
Inviolate tax and debt limitations and in the case of school districts on safeguarding the taxpayer from unnecessary levies.
Apparently, the Court has failed to realize that tax and debt
limitations and safeguards against unnecessary tax levies are
merely means of achieving economical and effective administration of county affairs, which is more basic and fundamental. In its earlier decisions, when municipal budgeting was
in an embryonic stage of development, the Court was probably
justified in taking a stand against providing in school budgets
for anticipated tax delinquencies, but the recent decision in the
Paducah case would have been more in line with progressive
judicial thinking if cognizance had been taken of the significance
of modern budgetary progress. At any rate, the fallacious
reasoning of the Court respecting the treatment to be accorded
tax delinquencies has tended to inhibit the incurring of debt by
counties, to encourage school districts to create debts, and to
hamstring both concerning sensible fiscal adminstration.
Judicial encouragement to maladministratwn of county
City of Owensboro v. Board of Trustees of Owensboro Public
Schools, 10 Ky. L. R. 40 (1888), City of Lexington v Board of Education of City of Lexington, 23 Ky L. R. 1663, 65 S. W 827, 98 A. L. R.
501 N. (1901), Board of Education of Newport, Ky v City of Newport, 171 Ky 234, 188 S. W 360 (1916), Board of Council of the City
of Winchester v. Board of Education of City of Winchester, 171 Ky.
692, 699, 188 S. W 755, 757 (1916), City of Paducah v. Board of
Education of Paducah, 289 Ky. 284, 158 S. W (2d) 615 (1942)
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general funds.-In addition to having excluded necessary governmental expenditures from debt limitations in 1902, continued
laxity by the Kentucky Court of Appeals prior to 193830 in
construing section 157 of the Constitution went a long way
toward removing all restraints and limitations on county expenditures and the creation of general fund indebtedness.
Beginning with City of Providence v. Providence Electric Thght
Co.,31 the amount of indebtedness which a county could incur
during any one year was to be ascertained by the maximum permissible tax levy of 50 cents per $100 of assessed valuation and
not by the actual levy. The long line of decisions wich for over
30 years adhered to this reasoning savor of legislation by judicial construction. This view is also supported by continued dissents by a minority of the Court. 32 What relation the maximum
permissible tax levy of a county bears to its actual revenues is
incomprehensible. The complete lack of such a connection is
so obvious that Judge Thomas in writing the majority opimon
of the Court in HM v Covington,3" which followed the Providence case, took the unusual position of giving a personal dissent and explained that he and others had disagreed with the
majority of the Court throughout their tenure as members.
In 1917, in McCrocklin v Nelson County Fiscal Court3 4
5
and Nelson County Fiscal Court v McCrocklinM
constitutional
restraints on county indebtedness were again mitigated considerably when the Court of Appeals sanctioned the practice of
fiscal courts of forwarding general fund deficits to succeeding
years for payment. This sanction, at least in theory, was weakened somewhat in holding that fiscal courts must have acted in
good faith in overestimating receipts or in underestimating tax
delinquencies, and that account must be taken of the amount
necessary to defray current and fixed expenses for essential gov'The

tendency of the Court in more recent years has been to

revert to a more stringent construction of debt limitations.
31122 Ky. 237, 243, 91 S. W 664,

665 (1906). Judge Thomas, in
Hockensmith v County Board of Education of Franklin County, 240
Ky. 76, 79, 41 S. W (2d) 656, 657 (1931), pointed out that the Court
in following the decision in the Providence case had never mentioned

or referred to section 4281u-4 of the statutes which limits county
expenditures to taxes "actually levied and collected for that year."
=Judge Dietzman, ConstitutionalLimitations on Public Indebtedness (1931), 20 Ky. L. J. 75, 78.
'4

264 Ky. 618, 623, 95 S. W (2d) 278, 280 (1936)
174 Ky. 308, 321, 192 S. W 494, 500.
175 Ky. 199, 205, 194 S. W 323, 326.
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ernmental purposes. Counties were also demed the authority
to fund floating debts and were directed to recall existing
bonds and reduce them to interest-bearing warrants.
Whatever restraining influence these latter interpretations
may have had on the creation of floating debts was swept away
3
when it was held
ten years later in Vaughan v. City of Corbnn
that under authority of the last sentence in section 158 of the
Constitution counties could fund floating debts. No doubt this
provision was intended to have application to floating debts
existing at the time the Constitution was adopted.31 Otherwise,
it would have authorized the very thing which section 157 was
designed to prohibit without a vote of the people. That this was
in effect what happened is evidenced by Judge Dietzman who
later wrote that there resulted "a steady procession of cases
to our court, most of them very friendly indeed, asking in
effect the validation of refunding bonds issued without a vote
of the people.''38 The decision in the Vaughan case has been
followed consistently, but not without vigorous minority dissents. 39 However, since the 1938 decision in Payne v. Covngton,40 which held invalid all debts in excess of annual revenue
receipts, the authority of counties to fund subsequent floating
debts may again be denied.
Apparently, 1938 marked a turning point in the Court of
Appeals' interpretation of section 157 of the Constitution. In
the Covington case and in subsequent cases 41 the Court has
brought its decisions more in accord with those of other jurisdictions and with those of the federal courts. In addition to
removing any legal justification for debts in excess of constitutional limits it has held the maximum indebtedness which a
-217 Ky. 521, 523, 289 S. W 1104, 1105 (1927).
First Trust Co. of St. Paul v. Board of Education of Whitley
County, Ky., 5 F Supp. 49 (E. D. Ky. 1934).
See Judge Dietzman and cases cited, ConstitutionalLimitations
on Public Indebtedness (1931), 20 Ky. L. J. 75, 82 note 6.
See City of Frankfort v. Fuss, 235 Ky. 143, 151, 29 S. W (2d)
603, 607 (1930), Elliott v. Fiscal Court of Pike County, 237 Ky. 797,
804, 36 S. W (2d) 619, 622 (1931); Hall v. Fiscal Court of Fleming
County, 239 Ky. 425, 428, 39 S. W (2d) 656, 657 (1931), Hill v. City
of Covington, 264 Ky. 618, 623, 95 S. W (2d) 278, 280 (1936).
276 Ky. 380, 123 S. W (2d) 1045 (1938).
Henderson v. Town of Mt. Vernon, 279 Ky. 829, 132 S. W (2d)
322 (1939), Fulton County Fiscal Court v. Southern Bell Telephone
and Telegraph Co., 285 Ky. 17, 146 S. W (2d) 15 (1940), Moss v.
City of Paducah, 285 Ky. 100, 147 S. W (2d) 59 (1941), Chestnut v.
City of Bowling Green, 285 Ky. 800, 149 S. W (2d) 523 (1941).
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county may incur during any one year must be governed by
revenues actually realized. In overruling all cases adhering to
the decision laid down in the Providence case, the Court remarked that these decisions had let down "the barriers to the
mischief obviously intended by the framers of the Constitution
to be prohibited, and invited an orgy of maladministration(,)
waste of public funds(,) and accumulation of indebtedness in
counties and municipalities of alarming and in many instances
ruinous proportions. '142 No doubt this is a strong statement
of the mischief that had been wrought, but the language of the
Court clearly implies that it had been influenced by the propensity of county officials to abuse the administrative freedom
and discretion permitted under prior decisions.
Notice was served in the Covington case that the decision
was not to have any retroactive effect but that its prospective
effect would be adhered to with scrupulous exactitude. Later
cases, where similar issues have been involved, have borne out
this note of warning.4 3 All officials charged in any manner with
duties even remotely connected with local debts and all bondholders and individuals concerned may do well to give these recent cases studious consideration. If implications in the Covington case are, as subsequent decisions would indicate, as
potent as they appear, they are virtual reservoirs of forewarnings. For instance, may the inference be drawn that all actions
of county officials will be upheld, where reliance was placed on
former decisions of the Court? Also, is the judicial notice to
be equally applicable to varying interpretations of the Court respecting other debt limitatins
Admsnmstratsve quandaries.-Presumably, no question of
doubt can exist respecting the validity of funding bonds properly issued since 1932, 44 as these have been issued under court
'Payne
1049 (1938)

v Covington, 276 Ky. 380, 388, 123 S. W

(2d) 1045,

'World Fire and Marine Ins. Co. v Tapp; Home Insurance Co.
v Same, 279 Ky 423, 431, 130 S. W (2d) 848, 852 (1939) Henderson
v. Town of Mt. Vernon, 279 Ky. 829, 830, 132 S. W (2d) 322, 323
(1939) Payne v City of Covington, 283 Ky. 848, 850, 143 S. W (2d)
727, 728 (1940); Chestnut v. City of Bowling Green, 285 Ky 800, 801,
149 S.W (2d) 523, 524 (1941)
"Henderson v. Town of Mt. Vernon, 279 Ky 829, 830, 132 S. W
(2d) 322, 323 (1939), Fulton County Fiscal Court v Southern Bell
Telephone and Telegraph Co., 285 Ky. 17, 28, 146 S. W (2d) 15, 21
(1940), Moss v City of Paducah, 285 Ky 100, 102, 147 S. W (2d) 59,
61 (1941), Chestnut v. City of Bowling Green, 285 Ky. 800, 801, 149
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validation, but, in the words of the local finance officer, "few
funding bonds antedating 1932 will bear close scrutiny ,,4"
Respecting the latter, which constitute the bulk of county general fund indebtedness, it has been necessary for the Court of
Appeals on a few occasions complacently to assume or allege, in
the absence of definite evidence to the contrary, the validity of
certain debts. 4 6 The local finance officer, though, is not to
assume but is to determine the validity of all debts to be funded.
This is expressly required of hun by law. When this requirement is considered along with the frequent irregular fiscal practices of county officials and the varying interpretations of the
courts, some grasp may be obtained of the administrative difficulties incident to refinancing.
No attempt has been made to treat exhaustively the many
administrative problems which promise to emerge from judicial
constructions of non-voted general fund county debt limitations.
It is hoped, however, that some of the most apparent problems
have been indicated, others may be observed in connection with
constructions of different constitutional debt limitations to be
noted later.
VOTED GENERAL

FUND DEBT LIMITATIONS

With the assent of "two-thirds of the voters, voting at an
election to be held for the purpose" counties may create indebtedness in excess of the income and revenues provided for
the year. This exception to the income limitation, together with
many other interesting questions arising in connection with
attempts of the Court to harmonize different constitutional proS. W (2d) 523, 524 (1941). Also, see Hall v. Fiscal Court of Flemmg County, 239 Ky 425, 39 S. W (2d) 656 (1931).
1H. Clyde Reeves, Report of the State Local Finance Officer
(1941), p. 13.

"Dietzman, Constitutional Limitations on Public Indebtedness

(1931), 20 Ky L. J. 75, 80 and Southern Bitulithic Company v
Also,
Treville, 156 Ky. 513, 517, 161 S.W 560, 562 (1913).
O'Bryan v. Owensboro, 24 Ky. L. R. 469, 475, 68 S. W 858,
(1902), Morris v. Hoagland, 116 S.W 684, 686 (not officially

De

see
862
reported) (1909) City of Louisville v. Gosnell, 22 Ky. L. R. 1524, 1525,
61 S.W 476 (1901) City of Frankfort v Morgan, 33 Ky. L. R. 297,
301, 110 S.W 286, 288 (1908), Lankford v. Burton, 165 Ky. 835, 839,
178 S.W 1094, 1096 (1915), Bosworth v. City of Middlesboro, 190
Ky. 246, 253, 227 S.W 170, 173 (1921) City of Marion v Haynes,
157 Ky 687, 693, 164 S.W 79, 82 (1914), Gevedon v. Fiscal Court of
Carlisle Co., 263 Ky. 465, 469, 92 S.W (2d) 746, 748 (1936).

KENTUcKY LAW JOURNAL

visions applicable to voted general fund debt limitations, have
caused considerable difficulty, and the facility with which
many of these debts may be refinanced will depend m large
measure on future clarification of 'doubtful issues which have
arisen.
Regussite na3ority of voters.-Origmally the Court was of
the opinion that the question concerning the creation of debts m
excess of the income and revenues provided for the year was to
47
be submitted at special elections held expressly for the purpose.
But one year later, 1896, it was held unnecessary to hold special
elections for this purpose, as such elections could be held along
with general elections. At the same tne the Court also decided
that the assent of two-thirds of all electors voting at the general
election was necessary to authorize the indebtedness. 48 But two
years later it was deemed sufficient if two-thirds of those voting
on the proposition voted for it, regardless of the number of votes
cast for other purposes. 49 Apparently, there is no longer any
doubt as to the manner and time of holding elections, as the
holding of the Montgomery case appears to be well established.
Tax rates to pay indebtedness.-The maximum county tax
rate-for other than school purposes authorized by section 157
of the Constitution is 50 cents per $100 assessed valuation, but
section 159 provides that whenever a county is authorized to
incur indebtedness it shall be required to levy a tax sufficient to
amortize the obligation within not more than 40 years. Decisions
as to which of these provisions is applicable to general fund
debts created by a vote of the people, have tended to confuse
rather than to clarify the issue. The first construction placed on
the 50-cent tax limit was in 1901, when that portion of the general tax levy of Nicholas County in excess of 50 cents was held
void. 50 This construction was held applicable to general fund
indebtedness until 1917 when, in City of Winchester v. Nelson,
" Fidelity Trust and Safety Vault Co. v. City of Morganflield, 96

Ky. 563, 567, 29 S. W 442, 443 (1895).
'Belknap v City of Louisville, 99 Ky. 474, 481, 36 S. W 1118,
1120 (1896), McGoodwm V. City of Franklin, 18 Ky. L. R. 324, 37
S. W 1129 (1896).
4
Montgomery County Fiscal Court v. Trimble, 104 Ky. 629, 47
S. W 773 (1898)

Whaley and others v. Commonwealth; Ratcliff, Sheriff v. Same;

and Same v. Nicholas County, 110 Ky. 154, 165, 61 S. W 35, 38

(1901).

Alsd, see Town of Bardwell v. Harlin and others, 118 Ky.

232, 80 S. W 773 (1904).
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all prior decisions were expressly overruled and counties were
permitted to levy a tax rate in excess of 50 cents to service voted
general fund indebtedness. 51 Prior to this decision, however,
the Court had remarked in a few instances, while deciding other
issues, that counties were privileged to levy taxes in excess of
50 cents per $100 to pay interest and to create sinking funds for
52
the retirement of debts authorized by a vote of the people.
Counties were thus confronted with the paradoxical situation of
the 50-cent levy serving as a limitation on the power to incur
indebtedness but not as a tax rate limitation as intended. However, with respect to general fund obligations created since
Payne v. City of Cowngton in 193858 it appears that the opinion
in the Winchester ease is no longer controlling and that counties
may not now incur general indebtedness with the expectation of
meeting it out of the proceeds of an additional levy 54
An interesting question arises respecting the general application of the authorized 50-cent levy m those counties with
bonded indebtedness created prior to enactment of statutes withdrawing, in whole or in part, certain properties from local taxation. For instance, section 171 of the Constitution as amended
in 1915 authorizes a classification of property for taxation. Pursuant thereto the legislature from 1917 to 1924 withdrew in
whole or in part many types of property from local taxation. 55
Particular reference is made here to the withdrawal from local
taxation in 1916 of shares of stock in bank and trust compames. 5 6
-175 Ky. 63, 70, 193 S. W 1040, 1043 (1917). This same conclusion

had been reached about two months earlier

in

McCrocklin v., Nelson

County Fiscal Court, 174 Ky. 308, 323, 192 S. W 494, 501 (1917), but

this decision did not expressly overrule prior opinions. As this
decision appears to have had reference to a hearing on a temporary
injunction and was not an appeal from a final judgment, technically,
anything said in the opinion has only the legal effect of dicta.
"Hammond v. Lester, 159 Ky. 310, 314, 166 S. W 976, 978
(1914), McCrocklin v. Nelson County Fiscal Court, 174 Ky. 308, 323,
192 S. W 494, 501 (1917).
276 Ky. 380, 123 S. W (2d) 1045.
",Fulton County Fiscal Court v. Southern Bell Telephone and
Telegraph Co., 285 Ky. 17, 28, 146 S. W (2d) 15, 21 (1940).
5Particular mention is made of the following classes of property" (a) unmanufactured agricultural products in manufacturing
plant or in hands of producer, (b) stored agricultural products, (c)
building and loan associations' stock and bank .deposits, (d) other
intangibles except franchises, (e) live stock, and (f) machinery
used in manufacturing, raw materials, and goods in process.
5Acts 1906, chap. 22, p. 88, Art. IV, subdiv. ii, sec. 1 as amended
by Acts 1924, chap. 117, p. 415; Carroll's Ky. Stats. (1936), sec. 4092;
Ky. Rev. Stats., 136.270.
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In 1929 the sheriff of Ohio County was enjoined from collecting
a tax bill from the Citizens' Bank of Hartford, Kentucky, insofar as the exemption of the bank shares from local taxation
by the 1924 act affected a special levy of 20 cents on each $100
of taxable property for the benefit of road and bridge bonds
issued under section 157a of the Constitution prior to enactment
of the exemption statute. 57 The decision was based on the
ground that (a) the constitutional provision authorizing the
levy'did not provide any means or machinery for assessment of
property, but simply conferred authority to levy taxes within
limits defined in accordance with provisions of section 159,
requiring an annual levy sufficient to discharge the obligation
within 40 years, and (b) the determination of what property is
or is not subject to local taxation is a proper subject of legislative power when authorized by the Constitution. Wat position
the Court would take under similar circumstances should contractual rights of bondholders be questioned is not known. The
federal courts have repeatedly held a state may not withdraw
from a local government power necessary to carry out valid contractual obligations. 58 For example, under authorization of
state legislative enactments, Quincy, Illinois, issued bonds and
provided for special taxes to pay the interest thereon. Subsequently, the acts were repealed and local areas were denied the
power to levy these special taxes, but the Court held that this
withdrawal of power was a nullity in so far as it affected contractual relations between the city and its bondholders. 59 If
the contractual rights of creditors were at stake, what position
would the Kentucky courts take 2 It is surprising that the issue
has not been presented for adjudication.
"Jones, Sheriff v Citizens' Bank of Hartford, 228 Ky. 699, 15
(2d) 468 (1929)
'Benjamin Fletcher Wright, The Contract Clause of the Constitution, Howard University Press (1938), pp. 226 ff., John Babry
Mathews, The American Constitutional System, McGraw-Hill Book
Company (1940), pp. 420-421. Also, see Wolff v New Orleans, 103
U. S. 358, 364, 26 Law Ed. 395, 398 (1880), Louisiana v. Pilsbury, 105
U. S. 278, 286, 26 Law. Ed. 1090, 1092 (1881), Ralls County Court v.
S.W

United States, 105 U. S. 733, 738, 26 Law. Ed. 1220, 1222 (1881); Nelson v Police Jury of St. Martin's Parish, 111 U. S. 716, 720, 28 Law.
Ed. 574, 576, 4 Sup.
U. S. 131, 29 Law.
Orleans, 215 U. S.
(1909).
"Von Hoffman

Ct. 648 (1884), Fish v. Jefferson Police Jury, 116
Ed. 587, 6 Sup. Ct. 329 (1885), Hubert v New
170, 175, 54 Law. Ed. 144, 147, 30 Sup. Ct. 40
v Quincy, 4 Wall. 535 (1867).
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Lzmitation measured by assessed valuation.-The second
important county debt limitation is measured by 2 per cent of
the assessed valuation of all taxable property The Court has
never given a complete answer as to what is included in the
assessed valuation of taxable property, but it has remarked that
the value of property is shown by the assessment 6o as finally
equalized, 6 1 including real and personal property 62 and franchise
assessments. 63 Supposedly, all properties subject to local taxation may be included in ascertaining the amount of indebtedness
that may be incurred under the 2 per cent assessed value limitation. 64 At least, there is nothing to indicate the contrary So
far, no question has been raised relative to the local finance
officer's using this measure in approving refunding bonds.
Exceptions to assessed valuatwn limitation.-" Unless in
case of emergency, the public health or safety so require" the 2
per cent limit in section 158 of the Constitution may not be exceeded. With two other exceptions, one of which is no longer
of material significance, this constitutes a limitation beyond
which even the people may not go. 65 Additional indebtedness
may be created for road and bridge purposes under section 157a,
and where indebtedness existed prior to the adoption of the Constitution in 1890 a further exception is made. Otherwise, 2 per
cent of the assessed value constitutes an overall ceiling above
which debts of any character may not be incurred.
Emergencies"When an emergency arises such as is named in section 158,
then certain limits fixed in that section are removed. But section
157 is still in force, and, while the emergency indebtedness may be
incurred, the provisions of section 157 still
provide how it may be
incurred; that is, by a vote of the people."'
"And while we will not undertake to lay down a rule by which
'Frost v. Central City, 134 Ky. 434, 442, 120 S. W 367, 369
(1909)
City of Winchester v. Nelson, 175 Ky 63, 66, 193 S. W 1040,
1041 (1917)
Wilkerson v. City of Lexington, 188 Ky. 381, 384, 388, 222 S.
W 74, 75, 77 (1920).
'City of Winchester v. Nelson, 175 Ky. 63, 66, 193 S. W 1040,
1041 (1917).
4'Gillis v. Anderson, 256 Ky 472, 479, 76 S. W (2d) 279, 283
(1934), Whitley County v. Hermann, 263 Ky. 440, 445, 92 S. W (2d)
797, 799 (1936).

1Knipper v. City of Covington, 109 Ky. 187, 191, 58 S. W 498,
499 (1900).
Knipper v. City of Covington, 109 Ky 187, 192, 58 S. W 498,
500 (1900).
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is to be determined in every case, it is apparent
an emergency
that such an emergency is some sudden or unexpected occasion for
action; some unfor(e)seen occurrence, condition, or pressing necessity, that requires immediate attention."'"

The strictness with which the Court has construed the
emergency provision contrasts strikingly with its liberality in
construing other debt limitations. Indebtedness in excess of
constitutional limitations has been sustained under the emergency provision on only two occasions neither of which involved
8
county debts.6 In both instances existing water works had
failed and no other means of obtaining water was available. But

the mere need of water works and a system of sewage in the
9
Other presssmaller cities does not constitute an emergency (
ing circumstances which have been construed not to constitute
an emergency include construction of urgently needed court-

houses,70 the necessity for an electrical lighting plant and sys71
tem in third and fifth class cities, overcrowding of schools and

lack of adequate facilities,7 2 and even the burning of a school
house.

73

Devces to avoid debt limitations.-Numerous counties have

resorted to a complicated and ingemous device, commonly
known as "the holding company plan," in order to escape debt
limitations imposed by sections 157 and 158 of the Constitution.

The courts have repeatedly upheld the validity of the scheme,
and it has been resorted to widely in the construction of schools,
courthouses, and hospitals. Since the plan has been upheld on
the ground that it did not constitute indebtedness of the county,
I City of Marion v. Haynes, 157 Ky. 687, 698, 164 S. W 79, 84
(1914).
"Samuels v. Clinton, 184 Ky. 97, 211 S. W 567 (1919), same,
188 Ky. 300, 221 S. W 1075 (1920), Harris v. Morganfield, 201 Ky.
588, 592, 257 S. W 1032, 1034 (1924).
City of Marion v. Haynes, 157 Ky. 687, 698, 164 S. W 79, 84
(1914), Hurst v. Millersburg, 220 Ky. 108, 111, 294 S. W 788, 789
Though not stated expressly the implication is left that
(1927).
such a state of affairs might constitute an emergency in larger cities.
Commonwealth, 139 Ky.
"Fiscal Court of Franklin County v
307, 117 S. W 301 (1909), Bradford v Fiscal Court of Bracken
County, 159 Ky. 544, 553, 167 S. W 937, 941 (1914).
Samuels v. City of Clinton, 184 Ky. 97, 105, 211 S. W 567, 570
(1919), Ky. Utilities Co. v. Ginsberg, 255 Ky. 148, 163, 72 S. W (2d)
738, 744 (1934).
1 Buckner v Board of Education of Owensboro City School District,)236 Ky 768, 34 S. W (2d) 236 (1930).
1 Nelson v. Board of Education, 213 Ky 714, 281 S. W 808
(1926)
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a discussion of it here would be largely irrelevant. Though there
is no decision to indicate that the device will ever be invalidated,
it is mentioned because of the possibility that, since the reinterpretation of section 157 in the Payne case, 74 the courts might
regard such a plan as a mere subterfuge to avoid constitutional
limitations.7 5 The Court might logically consider some county
contractual relationships with holding companies to constitute
county obligations not essentially different from other county
debts. It is a well known fact that the public generally has
looked on the device as being a mere subterfuge and has refused
to distinguish between obligations incurred under its protection
and those incurred through direct bond flotations.
Time TImitation.-The limitations imposed by sections 157
and 158 of the Constitution on the power of counties to create
indebtedness have been observed. The first, except as prostituted
by the courts, provides a tax rate limitation and a barrier against
any character or amount of indebtedness for any purpose beyond the income and revenues provided for the year, and the
second provides an additional assessed valuation limitation
against the creation of indebtedness in the aggregate. The third
major constitutional limitation is provided by section 159, which
limits debts to such amounts as may be paid within 40 years and
requires levying sufficient taxes and the creation of a siking
fund for the effectuation of this purpose. This limitation "applies to any indebtedness
which is transmuted into bonds
76
payable over a period of years."
Duties and privileges snherent in the authority to create
ndebtedness.-Section 159 as construed is self-executing, 77
and may not be limited by legislative action. The General
Assembly in 1932 attempted to restrict the character of bonds
'Payne v. Covington, 276 Ky. 380, 123 S. W (2d) 1045 (1938).
'For a discussion of the holding company device see John C.
Lovett, "Device for Avoiding ConstitutionalLimitations on the Indebtedness of School Districts in Kentucky," (1941) 29 Ky. L. J.
195.

",Herd v City of Middlesboro, 266 Ky. 488, 492, 99 S. W (2d)
458, 460 (1936).
'With the exception of Holzhauer v. City of Newport, 94 Ky
396, 407, 22 S. W 752, 754 (1893), which held enabling legislation is
required to make section 159 operative, this section has been held
consistently to be self-executing; but, since no such consistency has

marked constructions of other constitutional debt limitations, construction of 159 may not be firmly established.
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which could be issued to serial bonds with annual maturities, 78
but this portion of the act was invalidated as running counter to
section 159 of the Constitution. The Court reasoned that the
Constitutional "limitation is mandatory, and is addressed to the
Legislature as well as to the local legislative bodies. It is not
competent for the General Assembly to nullify the plan of
financing authorized by the Constitution, or to lessen the range
of discretion left to the local governments in such matters.'' 79
Apparently, little consideration was given to the power of the
legislature to prescribe, define, and regulate the powers and
duties of fiscal courts.
Though counties apparently are relieved of legislative interference with their privilege of incurring indebtedness, the
privilege carries with it certain imperatives duties. One of these
is the requirement that within constitutional limits taxes must
be levied sufficient to pay interest and to retire the debt within
40 years.80 Similarly, sokng funds must be provided,81 beginning with the creation of the debt and continued in force
throughout the life of the indebtedness.8 2 Should a county fail
either to levy sufficient taxes or to create and maintain the required sinking fund, mandamus will lie to compel compliance. 83
' 8Acts 1932, chap. 23, p. 126; Carroll's Ky. Stats. (1936), sec.
186c-8.

'Fox v Boyle County, 245 Ky. 27, 30, 53 S. W (2d) 192, 194
(1932). Compare this construction, however, with that of section
158 in County Debt Commission v. Morgan County, 279 Ky 476,
481-482, 130 S.W (2d) 779, 782 (1939) and in Clere v Board of
Education of Ashland, 211 Ky. 130, 133, 277 S. W 335, 336 (1925),
where it was held that the constitutional provision was merely a
limitation on legislative power.
City of Louisville v.. Zimmerman, 101 Ky. 432, 439, 41 S. W
428, 430 (1897), Woolley v City of Louisville, 114 Ky. 556, 571, 71
S. W 893, 898 (1903). Also, see Burkhart v. Vine Grove Common
School District, 26 Ky L. R. 262, 80 S. W 1128 (1904), Trustees
Common School District v Kane, 27 Ky L. R. 983, 985, 87 S.W 321,
323 (1905).
" O'Bryan, City Clerk v City of Owensboro, 113 Ky. 680, 689,
68 S.W 858, 861 (1902), E. T. Lewis Co. v. City of Winchester, 140
Ky 244, 247, 130 S.W 1094, 1095 (1910)
McDonald v City of Lexington, 253 Ky 585, 591, 69 S.W (2d)
1065, 1067 (1934), Fulton County Fiscal Court v Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph Co., 285 Ky. 17, 31, 146 S. W (2d) 15, 22
(1940).
' City of Frankfort v. Fuss, 235 Ky 143, 148, 29 S. W (2d) 603,
605 (1930), McDonald v City of Lexington, 253 Ky 585, 591, 69 S.
W (2d) 1065, 1067 (1934) Herd v City of Middlesboro, 266 Ky. 488,
493, 99 S. W (2d) 458, 461 (1936), Fulton County Fiscal Court v.
Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph Co., 285 Ky. 17, 31, 146 S.W
(2d) 15, 23 (1940).

COUNTY DEBTS IN

BASIC

UNDERLYING

ISSUES

OF

KENTUCKY

CONSTITUTIONAL

CONSTRUCTION

Two basic underlying difficulties of constitutional construction are discernable in the Court's attempt to interpret county
debt limitation provisions. One such issue relates to the proposition whether the constitutional limitations are self-executing
and binding on the legislative branch, or whether the legislature
may impose additional restrictions within the limits prescribed
by the Constitution. The other basic issue concerns the Court's
attempt to collate the different constitutional provisions, especially as amended by section 157a. Certain difficulties in this
respect have been observed in connection with road and bridge
bond limitations. Others will be observed later.8 4
Are debt limitatwons self-executmg'-With one exception
-construction of section 159-no consistency has marked the
Court's interpretations relative to the self-executory nature of
constitutional debt provisions. The failure of the Court to
reach a definite conclusion respecting this issue appears to be
responsible for many inconsistencies relative to other questions.
Space forbids adequate discussion of all such decisions, but
perhaps a few of the more significant ones should be noted
briefly 8 5
Section 2854 of the Kentucky Statutes and a Louisville city
ordinance provided that incurring indebtedness for the improvement of land for park property must be authorized by a twothirds majority of all votes cast at the general election. These
enactments were in pursuance of section 157 of the Constitution
which provides for a two-thirds vote of those voting at an election held for the purpose. In construing the statute and ordinance in connection with the constitutional provision the Court
in Belknap v. Louisville 0 held that the constitutional provision
was restrictive and that the legislature or city authorities could
impose additional restrictions. This decision, however, should
be contrasted with Board of Education of Winchester v City
of Winchester,87 where, under similar circumstances, the Court
eSee discussion of "permissible maturity dates" which is to
appear in the continuation of this article in a subsequent issue.
'The cases mentioned below are referred to because of their
significance as precedent-establishing decisions. No attempt is made
to follow their treatment in subsequent cases.
99 Ky. 474, 488, 36 S. W 1118, 1122 (1896).
120 Ky. 591, 594, 87 S. W 768 (1905)

L. J.-4
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said that "every provision of the Constitution is mandatory
The Legislature can neither subtract from nor add to
the constitutional requirement. The constitutional provision
regulates the subject, and removes it entirely from legislative
control."
In Clere v. Board of Education of the City of Ashland,s 8
the Court upheld a legislative act 8 9 limiting bonded indebtedness of second class cities for school purposes from 10 per cent
of assessed value as prescribed by section 158 of the Constitution to 2 per cent of the value of taxable property This was
on the ground that the former "simply fixes a limit beyond
which the legislature may not go, and leaves intact the already
existing power to provide how far a city may go -within that
limit. In other words, the provision is simply a limitation on
the legislative power and not a grant of power to the municipality " In County Debt Commission v Morgan CountyG° the
Court held that the County Debt Act of 1938 "in forbidding the
county to incur an indebtedness in excess of 0.5 per cent of the
assessed valuation without the approval of the County Debt
Commission does not contravene section 158, which permits an
indebtedness not exceeding 2 per cent of the assessed valuation.
Section 158 fixes the limit beyond which the Legislature cannot
go, but the section cannot be construed as preventing the Legislature from fixing a lower limit." Compare these decisions,
however, with Winchester v Neison9 1 and with EstiIl County v.
County Debt Commssswon. 92 In the former, subsection 34 of
section 3490 of the Kentucky Statutes, insofar as it required
bond issues to be redeemed within 20 years instead of 40 years
as provided by section 159 of the Constitution, was declared unconstitutional. The latter decision overruled the Clere and
Morgan County cases and denied to the legislature the power to
limit to 30 years maturities of road and bridge bonds issued
under section 157a of the Constitution.
A more detailed study of the Estill County case in respect
to the issue noted above, together with other related decisions,
u211 Ky. 130, 277 S. W 335 (1925).

Acts 1926, chap. 78, p. 266; Carroll's Ky Stats. (1930),
3235a-28.
279 Ky. 476, 481, 130 S. W (2d) 779, 782 (1939).
91175 Ky 63, 72, 193 S. W 1040, 1044 (1917).
286 Ky 114, 149 S.W (2d) 735 (1941)
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will be made later.9 3 However, it might be well to indicate here
that it also upheld the principle announced in the Morgan
County case to the effect that "the legislative power to regulate
procedure does not offend the constitutional provisions relating
to debt limitations." When tins holding is read in connection
with the demal in the same opinion of legislative power to lower
the debt contracting limit, it appears to imply that the local
finance officer may not withhold approval of county bonds winch
meet constitutional requirements and are otherwise issued according to law. One constitutional lawyer has taken the followmg view- "It never has been clear to me how the Court can
deny the power of the legislature to fix a lower debt contracting
limit and still hold that in contracting debts above this limit the
county must comply with the provisions of the County Debt Act
as a matter of procedure.' 9 Tins view suggests that if the
legislature may restrict procedure that it may also restrict debt
contracting limits or, else, that it may restrict neither. Of the
two alternatives, the former is the more tenable. Mr. Eblen
continues by stating "I still think the Clere and Morgan cases
were sound. The Court appears to have overlooked that the
pertinent constitutional provisions read that 'no county, etc.,
shall be authorized or permitted to mcur an indebtedness in
excess of a certain sum.' I think that the 'authorized or permitted' refers to authorization or permission by the legislature
since it is the source of the power of the county to contract debts.
If that be correct, then the Estill ease is wrong. "95 Should the
view be taken that the legislature may not restrict either debt
contracting limits or adminstrative procedures, it would appear
that debt enabling acts and provisions for court validation of
county bond issues are also restrictive and prohibited by constitutional mandate. Similarly, the 5 per cent maximum interest
rate and the ininmum selling value of par imposed by the legislature would also be unconstitutional. Such a stand inevitably
leads to numerous other inconsistencies and absurdities.
' See discussion of "permissible maturity dates" which is to
appear in a continuation of tis article in a subsequent issue. Also
see discussion of Fox v. Boyle County, supra, p 140.
" Letter of July 31, 1942, from Amos H. Eblen, Law Offices,
Smith and Leary, Frankfort, Kentucky

Ibid., letter of August 15, 1942.
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ROAD AND BRIDGE BOND LImITATIONS

With the advent of the automobile as a common means of
traffic throughout the state the people demanded improved highway facilities. Because of existing constitutional taxing and
debt limitations counties generally lacked fiscal capacity to
meet increased demands for highway construction and maintenance. In order to meet this demand the Constitution was
amended in 1909 so as to enlarge the taxing and borrowing
powers of counties for road and bridge purposes.
Section 157a, amending section 157, provides as follows

c

Any county may be permitted to incur an indebtedness
not in excess of five percentum of the value of taxable
property therein, for public road purposes
provided said
additional zndebtedness is submitted to the voters of the county for

their ratification or rejection at a special election held for said pur-

pose, in such manner as may be provided by law and when such
indebtedness is incurred by any county sasd county may levy, zn

additionto the tax rate allowed under section 157 of the Constitution

of Kentucky, an amount not exceeding twenty cents (20 cents) on
the one hundred dollars ($100.00) of the assessed valuation of said
county for the purpose of paying the interest on said indebtedness
and providing a sinking fund for the payment of said indebtedness."
(Emphasis the writer's.)

With the possible exception of one issue, constructions
placed on this section of the Constitution have not been subject
to such violent shifts in precedent as those.placed on other constitutional debt limitations, but this exception probably has
caused more administrative difficulty than all other judicial
constructions combined. Apparently, the Court has never
known whether section 157a is to be construed as being in effect
an extension of section 157 or whether it is to be construed as
being separate and apart from the original instrument. Variations in interpretations here have resulted in litigation having
far-reaching social and economic implications.
Difficulties in construing section 157a are clearly discernible in the language of the Court when its opinions are placed
in juxtaposition. On March 24, 1916, in Gatton v. Fiscal Court
of Daviess County 96 the Court held that an amendment to the
constitution or statute should not be considered as a part of the
original, but as having the effect of a "codicil to a will." Three
months later in Bird v Asher 97 this interpretation was weak169 Ky 425, 432, 184 S. W 1, 3.
170 Ky. 726, 735, 186 S. W 663, 666 (1916).
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ened somewhat when the Court remarked that "Section 157a
must be treated independent of any other section in
the Constitution. It is a complete section in itself." But in
1921, Hughes v. Eisen9 s held that section 157a "enlarges and
extends section 157."
Subsequently, each of the two latter
views has at different times been relied on in resolving other
constitutional issues.
One result of the view that section 157a is separate and
independent of other constitutional provisions is discernible in
litigation respecting elections authorizing indebtedness for road
purposes. There is nothing in section 157a or in section 4307
of the statute putting it into operation 99 to indicate what proportion of votes constitutes the requisite majority Had section
157a been conceived of as it later was in Hughes v. Eisen, as
being an enlargement and an extension of section 157, the Court
would have been constrained to follow precedents set under 157
and to construe the prescribed majority of votes to mean a twothirds majority Instead, section 157a was held to be entirely
independent of other constitutional provisions. As a result, elections under its provisions may be held at any tne, and a mere
majority of the votes cast is sufficient to authorize the issuance
of road and bridge bonds.iO ° Thus, it happens that the organic
law governing elections to authorize the issuance of general fund
bonds and that governing the authorization of road and bridge
bonds is as different in each instance as if the authority therefor
flowed from different legal instruments.
Other vital issues such as negotiability, permissible maturity
dates, and contractual rights of holders of road and bridge
bonds have hinged on whether section 157a was to be considered
as being a separate and independent provision or as being an
addition to and an integral part of other constitutional provisions. However, these issues can be discussed more advantageously in the continuation of this article in connection with refinancing difficulties. It will suffice at this stage that both constructions have been employed alternately, and, as respects
,8190 Ky. 661, 664, 228 S. W 676, 677.
wActs 1914, chap. 80, sec. 21, p. 338; Ky. Rev. Stats. secs. 178.010,
178.170.
' Albright v Ballard County Judge, 164 Ky 747, 748, 176 S. W
185, 186 (1915) Armstrong v. Fiscal Court of Carter County, 169 Ky.
433, 184 S.W 4 (1916), Cleary v. Pieper, 169 Ky 434, 435, 184 S. W
4 (1916), Crick v. Rash, 190 Ky. 820, 824, 229 S. W 63, 65 (1921)
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negotiability, the attempt to collate section 157a with sections
157 and 159 led to a rehearing and a complete reversal m the
Court's decision.' 0 1

",1 Pulaski
S. W

County v. Ben Hur Life Association, 286 Ky. 119, 149
(2d) 738 (1941).

